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THE REVIEW: MI6: FIFTY YEARS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
 
                          Stephen Dorril's post-war history of SIS will be  
                                          the definitive work for years to come. 






In 1999, Professor Christopher Andrew, the leading historian on intelligence studies, warned against 
creating a divide between popular and academic intelligence history. There was a necessity, he 
argued, to reach a mass audience as well as the more specialised community of intelligence 
scholars. (1) In many ways, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, which was published by a 
major commercial company, Fourth Estate, in May 2000, did manage to bridge the divide. It was 
reviewed in all the major newspapers, magazines and in many journals. In the journal Cold War 
History, Richard J. Aldrich, Professor of International Relations at Warwick University and a highly 
acclaimed author and authority on the intelligence world, labelled MI6 "a landmark volume". (2) It 
sold 20,000 copies in the UK and under the title, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's 
Secret Intelligence Service, 40,000 in the United States where the all-important trade publication, 
Publishers Weekly (June 2000), gave it a starred rating for its "in-depth research for the serious 
student and entertainment for the well-informed spy buff".  
 
The book's prime focus is the post-Second World War European continent and the Secret 
Intelligence Service's (SIS – more commonly known as MI6) intelligence-gathering and special 
operations, principally in the Middle East. South-East Asia and Africa were not dealt with in any 
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great depth; it was, and is intended, that they would be covered in another volume dealing with the 
Service's and MI5's involvement in counter-insurgency during the period of the rundown of the 
British Empire. A study of MI6's worldwide stay-behind networks, popularly known as 'Gladio', 
was almost complete and had been part of the original text, but the book's already considerable 
length led to it being cut. Gladio: MI6, the SAS and the Stay-Behind Networks is to be published in 
2011/12. Similarly, material dealing with the Service's involvement in the Irish "Troubles" and its 
relationship with journalists during the Cold War is earmarked for other books (The Dogs in the 
Street: British Intelligence and the Troubles to be published in 2012/13 and Agents of Influence: 
Journalists, Writers and MI6 at a later date). 
 
A major concern of the publisher was to have a full history that brought MI6 up to the present day. 
This was achieved but the section on the later period (1966-2000) is not extensive and is covered in 
one hundred pages. The main focus, therefore, is the period 1944 to 1966, which covers the change 
from the Second World War 'hot war' to the emerging 'Cold War' and the development of the Service 
into the modern SIS, a process which began in the 1960s. It is also a demarcation line in terms of 
the documentary record; the archive and secondary material becomes much thinner when dealing 
with  the post-seventies period. Noting that the book's main focus of study is on the two decades up 
to 1966, Aldrich acknowledged this as "a strength, not a weakness, and will please Cold War 
Historians. Dorril has focused his considerable investigative powers to give us the most detailed 
picture of postwar MI6 yet to emerge." (3) 
 
In terms of structure there were potentially a number of ways with dealing with the vast amount of 
material (800 pages with nearly 400,000 words and another 61 pages of notes and 30,000 additional 
words) that is contained in the book. The decision was made to split the book into a number of 
defined sections, each dealing with different areas and aspects of the Service's activities. Within 
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each section, the chapters run chronologically across a specific time-frame. The structure was 
influenced by the experience of working on a joint book on the Profumo Affair (Honeytrap: The 
Secret Worlds of Stephen Ward, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) with the investigative writer, 
Anthony Summers, who stressed the importance of chronology. Indeed, as a central strand of the 
methodology, the mantra became – chronology is everything. Even well-respected academic books 
often fail to pay heed to that and can be cavalier with chronology or drift confusingly from subject 
to subject. My standard technique is to take the research material and once it is typed up, to put into 
a strict chronology – by year, month and by day. This is a long drawn out process but it pays 
dividends by helping to illuminate how and why certain operations and decisions were undertaken 
or made. (4) 
 
Problems over editing copy frequently arise for an author when published by a major commercial 
publisher. The editor at Fourth Estate, however, was very supportive and made few changes and 
little editing to the completed text. Inevitably, there were discussions/arguments about the amount 
of space available for notes and bibliography, and, equally inevitably, compromises had to be made 
by the author. The notes for MI6 are not perfect by the standard of some academic publishers but 
are far superior to almost all commercial publications, containing sixty-two pages of quite detailed 
notes. Unable to give space to a full bibliography and all sources, a compromise was made by 
giving a note to each paragraph, rather than each quote/source/fact. Within these paragraph notes, 
the sources run top to bottom and contain, in the first instance, full bibliographic details. Sometimes 
if the same source is used for a paragraph then, in order to save space,  it was decided that the note 
numbers would be combined. There are 61 pages of notes which compares favourably with the 
recent (September 2010) publication of the "authorised" history of MI6 by Professor Keith Jeffrey 
of Queen's University, Belfast, (5) which contains 25 pages of rather thin notes that fail to make 
even a rudimentary reference to documents within the Service's archive. Former MI6 officer and 
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renowned historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper, wrote that "When a historian relies mainly on primary 
sources, which we cannot easily check, he challenges our confidence and forces us to ask critical 
questions. How reliable is the historical method? How sound is his judgement?". (6) There is very 
little in MI6 that cannot be checked. 
 
Research for the book was constructed from material collected over many years, a process that 
accelerated in the early 1990s and was completed in 1999. This was a period when I was self-
employed undertaking free-lance writing and journalism, and was generally regarded as an 
investigative journalist. No grants were available for research for the book, though I did towards the 
end receive two small grants (K. Blundell Trust and the Royal Literary Fund) to help me with the 
the editing of the book when I became seriously ill. Therefore, I was reliant on the advance, which 
had long been exhausted, and my own meagre financial resources. In many ways, necessity became 
the mother of invention. I had to undertake research in ways that were not normally used. It was 
also undertaken before the Internet was generally available as a research tool. 
 
In reviewing MI6, Richard Aldrich claimed that "Dorril belongs to the Premier League of 
investigative researchers. These individuals distinguish themselves by tackling seemingly difficult 
subjects and displaying research that is often ingenious." In asking what dividends does Dorril's 
approach deliver?, he added: "First and foremost this is an extraordinary compendium, bringing 
together almost all that is currently available on the subject" using a "diverse range of research 
materials". It was based on "careful and comprehensive combing of a vast range of secondary 
material, much of it well researched". And even where it was controversial, "the more interesting 
assertions rest on several sources". (7) 
 
Indeed, MI6 was the first detailed, heavily researched and systematic study of the Secret 
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Intelligence Service in the post-war period. It was also the first to centre on the Service's Special 
Operations (more commonly known as covert operations) in that period and place them in the 
broader context of Britain's foreign policy concerns. It was followed a year later by Richard 
Aldrich's The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (8), an impressive 
work begun when he was Fulbright Fellow at Georgetown University in Washington DC and based 
on extensive research in the American files. It is, however, a study of the American and British 
intelligence services' impact on the Cold War and covers other agencies besides the Secret 
Intelligence Service. Though we differ in interpretation on some areas (exile operations against the 
Soviet Union - 9), we agree on the importance of some previously neglected subjects such as 
deception (10). Despite the extensive archival research, Aldrich's book – which I greatly admire, 
knowing how difficult this subject area is to research - contains little that specifically contradicts or 
challenges the research of MI6, which, in many ways, is unique. Whilst there have been many 
books in the United States covering the same area and time-frame with regard to the activities of the 













METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
 
 
I indirectly created for myself major obstacles by dealing (almost) exclusively with post-Second 
World War intelligence affairs and, in particular, British ones, and, even more so, specifically MI6 
operations. Few writers, researchers or academics had ventured down this route, partly because they 
believed there were no files on which to base their research. In an interview for Radio Four News  
on 26 September 2010 (11) MI6's "authorised historian", Professor Keith Jeffrey, said he was 
thankful that he had to stop his own research at the beginning of the Cold War. "I fell down on my 
knees and thanked the Lord I was stopping at 1949." He had, he admitted, signed a "Faustian Pact" 
in which he saw everything up to 1949 but had no wish to go further. "Yes, there's lots more 
exciting stuff to be done in the future but that's for my successor – if there is one." In reporting 
Jeffrey's comments, The Times (18 September 2010) said the secrets of the post-1949 period "may 
not be known for years, if ever". This betrays a certain unwillingness to acknowledge the existence 
of MI6, which like other recent books on the subject he fails to list in his bibliography. 
 
 
Until the publication of Jeffrey's book, the Secret Intelligence Service had always claimed it was an 
ultra-secret agency that would not release any files since it had no wish to compromise its  
guarantee to agents it had recruited that it would never reveal their names or details of operations. 
When the Service went through the process of "avowal" in 1988, which for the first time put MI6 
on a constitutional basis – up until that point it had not officially existed even within the British 
unwritten constitution – there was little change in official policy and the Service remained closed to 
any form of scrutiny. (12) In contrast, the Security Service (MI5) undertook a major clean up of its 
public image following the release of Peter Wright's controversial book, Spycatcher (1986), and the 
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damaging revelations about alleged plotting against Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which had an 
effect on recruitment to the Service. A policy decision was made to employ a PR consultancy firm, 
with the result that MI5 began to make it self known to the public in a controlled manner. (13) The 
John Major government (1992-97) helped the process with the introduction of the "Open 
Government" initiative (too late for MI6), which led to a less draconian attitude with regard to the 
release of files on the part of the "weeders". This included a clever drip feed of files released to the 
National Archives (then the Public Records Office) at Kew - mostly dealing with pre-Second World 
War and wartime exploits, which led to number of popular books detailing in a largely sympathetic 
manner some of the MI5's more successful operations. This would eventually lead to the publication 
of the Security Service's official history by Professor Christopher Andrew. (14) 
 
These initatives, however, barely registered with MI6 whose primary concern, as articulated by its 
successive chiefs, was to retain the aura of secrecy that surrounded the Service. (15) A few books 
were sanctioned by former MI6 officers or "insiders" (officers "Alan Judd" aka Alan Petty and 
Harry Ferguson, and journalist Gordon Shepherd) who were given some access to the files but they 
only dealt with operations going back to 1909-1920. (16) Their publication did not result in the 
transfer of the few files actually still existing to Kew (17) and in the intervening years, no post-war 
files have been released except by default through releases in other departments such as, 
occasionally, the Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office (FCO) or via discussion through bodies such 
as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and, in one case, a Court appearance.*  
 
A major traditional academic work on MI6 did not arrive until 2004 with the publication of Philip 
H. J. Davies's well-researched book, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying. Even so it was almost  
 
*The strange release of SIS documents to the Court in the case in 2000 of arms dealer, go-between 
and MI6 agent, Stefan Kock, is the only example of that I am aware of original contact reports and 
not post-fact specially compiled reports being released in the public domain. (18) 
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entirely devoid of official documents for the post-war period (no more than a dozen from different 
departments in a long dense chapter) and relied heavily on interviews with former officers. (19) 
 
"Dorril," noted Aldrich in his review of MI6, "makes the compelling observation that secret services 
do not always leave a fully documented trail to be archived. Even when they do, these archives may 
not make it to the [National Archives] at Kew to be perused by historians." (20) Even though 
Professor Jeffrey, who was allowed access to the Registry for his "authorised" history, told the BBC 
that the MI6 archive is "the holy grail of British archives" and that it was "a cornucopia, an 
extraordinary Aladdin's cave of historical materials", even he found it very patchy. "Quite a lot of 
stuff has been destroyed over the years. It hasn't all survived." (21) It is estimated that only ten per 
cent of SOE/MI6 files have been kept. (22)  Each time the Service moved office, masses of files 
were, apparently, simply incinerated. However, as Aldrich has noted, the processing by the 
authorities of documents in other departments is uneven and 'weeders' make mistakes when 
releasing them. Some Foreign Office files do contain discussion of MI6 operations for the period 
immediately after the Second World War but following the defection in 1951 of the traitors, Guy 
Burgess and Donald Maclean, silence descended on the Foreign Office and references to the SIS 
(our "Friends" as they were known) were largely suppressed or weeded out. (23) 
 
With enough time to search thoroughly and to work laterally though unlikely files, some persistent 
academic archival researchers might claim that, "with enough coffee and cigarettes, most subjects 
can be examined. The motto of these dedicated denizens of the archives is that there are no secrets, 
only, lazy researchers." (24) That initially appears an attractive claim, and it is true that a 
considerable volume of material has been declassified and released, but in the last decade few 
substantial bodies of Cold War secret service records have been released compared to other areas of 
the period, and in the case of MI6, very little indeed. Aldrich has also warned those studying 
intelligence against viewing official archives at the National Archives as an "analogue of reality". In 
12 
addition to the problem of a lack of files, there is another one with regard to the few files that do 
make it to the archives – are they to be trusted? Some researchers insist that, "however thorough the 
research, investigations conducted within the [NA] are ultimately trapped in a domain governed by 
the authorities ... Ultimately, to locate most of one's research in the [NA] is to accept that the broad 
nature of things on the historic menu is controlled by the authorities." (25) There is the danger of 
being entranced by the National Archive's "efficient history supermarket" and "pre-selected menu" 
of intelligence material. In general, British academics dealing with the intelligence services research 
too narrowly and miss out on important material that simply cannot be found in the traditional 
archives. (26) 
 
Contrast their approach with that of John Newman in the United States and his detailed analysis of 
the hundreds of thousands of CIA documents released over the past two decades concerning the 
relationship between the agency and Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin of President 
Kennedy*, in his book, Oswald and the CIA (27). Based on his twenty years experience as a 
Military Intelligence officer in the US intelligence community, Newman produced a unique study of 
CIA files which detailed how an intelligence agency actually works in practice rather than in theory. 
It bears little resemblence to the accounts that we have to date. It illustrated how the imposition of 
ultra secrecy to protect the agency from outside scrutiny, but also the internal divisions within it, 
mean that files rarely contain the whole story and that summaries of files (what we usually see in 
the archives) are written with an awareness to their eventual viewing by outsiders and are therefore 
not entirely trustworthy. By the very nature of being "intelligence" files, less trust can be placed in 
them than, for example, diplomatic files which, although also concerned with secrecy, simply do not  
 
* Many academics in Britain (but no longer in the United States) are simply not willing to study the 
material in this area, even though, following President Clinton's sanctioned JFK Records Act of 
1992, the Archives now contain more files on the day-to-day operations of an intelligence agency 
than any other archive. (28) 
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have the same degree of need to conceal, not only from external monitoring but also from 
colleagues (and future scrutiny by historians). 
 
In considering these restrictions – both involuntary and voluntary – on the use of traditional 
archives and files, and acknowledging that MI6 is "a substantial piece of research", Aldrich notes 
that "it also represents a methodological challenge. It confronts historians of the clandestine Cold 
War, and especially what Donald Cameron Watt has called the 'British School' of Intelligence 
Studies (29), with an awkward question. How far can this subject be examined convincingly by 
moving through archives that have been 'dry-cleaned' by the authorities? A reader's ticket and a 
sharp pencil may be the right toolkit for a study of British reactions to the Marshall Plan, but is it 
the right one for researching secret service history?" (30) 
 
Coverage of intelligence matters in the post-war period had been mostly left to journalists and pro-
Service propagandists such as the Daily Express's Chapman Pincher (31), and investigative writers 
such as Tom Bower and Philip Knightley (32). Many of the books covering this area were obssessed 
with security and intelligence service "moles" such as Kim Philby and George Blake, and were 
reliant on anonymous sources and were generally poorly sourced and referenced. The phenomenon 
of "molemania" disfigured so much historical writing on the British secret services and the Cold 
War with the result that the over concentration on this area led to large areas of British intelligence 
"remaining unknown to us". Aldrich notes that MI6 does not deal with that "over-familiar 
stereotype, obsessive 'molemania'" but "instead tries to investigate more of the real work-a-day 
world of British secret service". (33) 
 
Until recently, few writers dealt with the Service's Special Operations. Nicholas Bethel's book on 
the 1949 Albanian operation and Tom Bower's investigative books on the Baltics and his 
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"biography" of the Chief of MI6 during the late 50s and early 60s, Sir Dick White, were exceptions. 
(34) These were good books but lacked sufficient sourcing to be taken seriously by academics as 
they tended to be over-reliant on anonymous sources and interviews. Similarly, Nigel West's low-
key, and rather thin post-war history of MI6, The Friends (1988), which also crossed over into the 
work of the Security Service (MI5), had few sources, references and notes. (35)  
 
Over the past twenty-five years, "Nigel West",  whose real name is Rupert Allason, has been the 
most successful writer on the security and intelligence world, and is the author of 20 books on the 
subject. Between 1987 and 1997 he served as a Conservative MP; his father had been  
Parliamentary Secretary to the disgraced War Minister, John Profumo. (36) Beginning as a 
researcher for the popular intelligence writer, "Richard Deacon" (aka Donald McCormick) (37), he 
used his family background and contacts to interview a number of retired former officers of the 
security and intelligence services, and in the early eighties produced the two books that made his 
name (MI5 – 1982 and MI6 – 1983). (38) West's technique was to amass as many books as possible 
on the intelligence world and supplement their stories with details of the officers involved. They 
were surprisingly successful given that they were often densely packed with names and detailed 
structure maps of the services. His books helped fulfil the appetite of the newspapers for stories of 
traitors inside the services and were available in a period (1980s) when there was generally a 
paucity of reliable material on the intelligence world. West was clever at repackaging old material 
and refreshing it by injecting it with new research. Most journalists seemed unaware that some of 
the material had been published before. They were in many ways "potboilers", lacking references to 
sources, which made it hard to verify the material disclosed. However, by publishing so many new 
names West did, by default, help create a base from which to investigate the intelligence services on 
a more structured basis. Friends was a step foward in terms of investigating MI6 in that it dealt 
with, for the first time, the post-war period. West described it as a "nuts-and-bolts" affair on how 
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"the country's overseas, clandestine intelligence-gathering arm made the transformation from 
Empire to membership of the EEC". (39) 
 
More interesting and serious was Anthony Verrier's Through the Looking-Glass: British Foreign 
Policy in the Age of Illusions, published in 1983; a book that particularly influenced me with its 
informed view of the role of the intelligence services in post-war Britain. A former Observer 
journalist, Verrier (now dead) was the Defence Correspondent of the News Statesman in the 1960s 
and later became a Research Fellow at St Anthony's College, Oxford, which has often referred to as 
the "Spook's College" because of the number of former intelligence personnel attached to it. Verrier 
was the ultimate "insider" which is easily established by the number of people listed in the 
introduction to his book who had helped him. At the time, only those in the know would recognise 
their names but they are a veritable Who's Who of the intelligence world. (40) Research into their 
backgrounds revealed that they included former senior MI6 officers. 
 
Verrier was an elegant writer with a beautiful turn of phrase who made telling comments about 
British foreign policy. (41) His central argument was that following the Second World War, in the 
absence of a strong economy and large defence forces, Britain had increasingly relied on the 
substitute influence and capabilities of the intelligence services to pursue a foreign policy that 
presented Britain as a still great power. This is summed up in the oft-repeated phrase used by 
Foreign Office officials and ministers such as Douglas Hurd (42), as "punching above our weight" 
(a view recently aired – October 2010 - during the debate on the economic "cuts" by the Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, and his Minister of Defence, Dr. Liam Fox). (43) Verrier saw strong links 
between the servants of the Victorian Empire who worked in far outposts of the Empire and the 
officers of the post-war MI6. He had strong sympathies with a Service which, he believed, 
contained some of the brightest and best, and who were well aware that it (British foreign policy) 
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was all an illusion. 
 
Verrier's stimulating book illuminated some previously unknown areas of MI6's operations (such as 
Ireland and in the Middle East - 44) and was very good at illustrating the place of the Service in 
Britain's foreign-policy domain as part of what he termed the "Permanent Government" and that, 
whilst its officials were keenly aware of economic or political realities, politicians invariably paid 
little heed to them. (45) In a sense, its starting point is Dean Acheson's infamous and still relevant 
remark at West Point on 5 December 1962 that Britain "has lost an empire and has not yet found a 
role". The book is a view of the world as told through MI6 eyes, principally those of former Chief, 
Sir Dick White. With its air of authority on the subject, Verrier's text was semi-academic in tone but 
lacked, in some areas, enough documentation, references or sources to place complete trust in his 
account. However, it was possible to identify some of the MI6 sources (such as Frank Steele on 
Ireland - 46) and follow them up. 
 
Much current literature on intelligence, notes Aldrich, "presents a picture of the British secret 
services as broadly focused upon obvious foreign enemies in hot and cold wars. In reality, their 
targets were far more diverse." It is partly from admiration of Verrier and his general overview of 
the Service that, as Aldrich further acknowledges, "Commendably, Dorril avoids this and other 
stereotypes that have dogged the history of the British secret service. We do not get 'enemy-led' 
history but a balanced picture in which intelligence is gathered on neutrals, even on allies." (47) 
Faced with the problem of  the lack of Service files, until recently, academic research and writing 
on intelligence largely avoided the problems of dealing with the post-war and cold war period. 
However, the lack of transparency in the intelligence world and the defiency in information do not 
invalidate areas of study such as secret intelligence. In considering researching the Irish "Troubles" 
– and here is a valid analogy with researching MI6 – M. L. R. Smith suggests that "the barrier to 
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scholarly interpretation is purely a mental hurdle that has grown up in the minds of academics, 
fortified by three decades of established methods of thinking". (48) That there is an absence of  
perceived reliable information is often an excuse used to rationalise the lack of the study of 
particular areas and to avoid, in the case of the Irish conflict but valid in terms of special operations, 
its "more unsavory aspects". Smith believes that the researcher "who ploughs his or her way 
through the literature trying to constuct a coherent picture ... is facing no more and no less difficulty 
than the Kreminologists or China-watchers of times past. They could not write as if they had a 
direct line into the Soviet and Chinese politburos. Instead, they relied on very careful analysis of the 
outpourings of the state propaganda machines to discern what was happening behind the iron and 
bamboo curtains." (49) The available evidence can be used in a way compatible with academic 
research standards. Indeed, Smith argues that because evidence is never complete or all-revealing 
there is a need for academics in the first place to assess and interpret available information. (50) 
 
Aldrich makes the point that my work involves research into areas that have been "wilfully 
resistant" and that he has, more importantly, adopted an approach that "challenges current 
mainstream practice". It requires us to consider "how might we best go about rolling back the 
frontiers of a no less stuborn opponent, the secrecy that still blocks the road to a fuller 
understanding of the clandestine Cold War". (51) Breaking with most intelligence history conducted 
in Britain over the last two decades, Dorril, notes Aldrich, "has not spent long in the [National 
Archives]". (52) This partly because of his shared view with historian Alex Danchev that 
"Conversations occuring in corridors or over telephone, or at cocktail parties can shape events ever 
more decisively than whole stacks of official memoranda that find their way into the archives". In 
order to unravel the activities of MI6, "one has to dig deep and sift carefully, in the manner of the 
archaeologist, but also acculturate, like some intrepid anthropologist, to a strange and secretive 
society whose intricate social and professional networks are familar to their members but quite 
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baffling to the outsider, whose currency is the informal understanding, and whose transactions 
consist chiefly of unwritten and sometimes unspoken agreements." (53) 
 
In order to break into that secretive network, notes Aldrich, "Dorril has conducted a remorseless 
trawl of the secondary literature, including the most obscure theses and privately published 
memoirs. This has been combined with press material, correspondence and interviews with 
witnesses, to provide a detailed institutionalist survey of a subject that many still regard as 
impenetrable." In doing so, Dorril (along with Scott Lucas*) "shine a light into some dark corners, 
expecially the vexed issue of British and American attitudes to liberation and the prospect of rolling 
back the frontiers of Stalin's Soviet empire in eastern Europe". Partly as a result of their efforts, 
mainstream writers on international affairs, on both sides of the Atlantic, now realise that 
"Liberation" was a more important issue for policy makers than hitherto realised. (54) 
 
Whilst it is true that there has been in recent years a growing interest in British clandestine activities 
in the Third World after 1945, Aldrich notes that an overtly revisionist tone has been less evident. 
"Perhaps this reflects a tendency to see these matters through a colonial rather than a Cold War 
prism, or perhaps Cold War interest in Britain has simply focused upon attempting to claim a British 
'share of the Cold War action', rather than assessing the nature of British responsibility. There is, 
nevertheless, a distinctly new revisionist tone to the work of Stephen Dorril" (55), who is part of 
a discernible group of critical writers** on intelligence in Britain. Even so, Dorril concedes that 
"MI6 is a vital, essential arm of the state and lurking beneath his indignant text is a deep admiration 
for 'half a century of intriguing, spying and thuggery'." (58) 
 
* Scott Lucas is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham. (56) 
** In particular, Aldrich is making reference here to the work of Mark Curtis. (57) 
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A central plank of the research for MI6 and guiding philosophy is the idea that there is more on the 
secret world  in the public domain and open sources than anyone (including academics and the 
security and intelligence services) realised. (59) This view was primarily derived from Peter Dale 
Scott, the main influence on my methodeology, whose work I first came across in the late 1970s 
when he was a Professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Born in 1929, Scott 
was a former Canadian diplomat who, having seen the diplomatic cables on Vietnam, became an 
early critic of  the war. (60) His book The War Conspiracy (1972) was immensely impressive being  
very different in structure, format and content to almost everything else that I read on the Vietnam 
War. Scott was a footnote connoisseur; notes that often seemed to be the basis of books in 
themselves. Scott's central methodological viewpoint was that Modern society is "open with a rich 
source of materials". (61) For his book on Vietnam, he relied on "traditional sources" – memoirs, 
newspaper articles from many countries (by experienced Asian observers), congressional committee 
hearings, annual reports of corporations and basic reference works. In turn, he often attacked these 
self-same sources for being willing intelligence service conduits for disinformation. 
 
In a later book, Drugs, Oil and War (2003), Scott questioned the "archival bias" (62) that the "truth 
about policy should be studied chiefly from recorded bureaucratic discussions, statements and 
rationalizations". He argued that, although there are many such excellent studies, "we risk losing 
sight of of the possibility that a significant part of the process lies elsewhere".  Scott makes the case 
for "archival scepticism" as much of the intelligence record is unreliable. (63)  Some historians take 
note of that but many do not and accept the archive record with little scepticism or recognition that 
the very nature of how such records are compiled and collated creates problems. Unsurprisingly, 
Scott was suppportive of John Newman's work (see above) and the pair exchanged research. 
 
It was, for a long period, not accepted that immediately following the assassination of President 
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John F. Kennedy, US policy on Vietnam changed (this does not imply cause and affect). It is still a 
highly controversial area but many historians now accept as a "historical fact" that on 24 November 
1963 - two days after the assassination - there was an initiation of a policy reversal and instead of a 
planned withdraw of American combat troops, the "central objective" changed to assisting South 
Vietnam "to win" the conflict*. (64) Scott asserted that a ultra-secret National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM 273) amended on the 24th had authorised the reversal. He attempted to 
reconstruct NSAM 273 from references in the press and public documents. (65) His analysis was 
partially vindicated by the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1972 (just has his book was being 
published) but was only recognised as being accurate in the 1980s when the Memoradum was 
finally declassified and published. (66) 
 
From studying Scott's work flowed a number of theories; principally that secret agencies are not as 
secret as they believe themselves to be. My psychology degree and, in particular, study of Freud 
was a useful guide. According to psychoanalytic theory total secrecy is rarely possible as there is 
always a degree of "leakage" whether directly or indirectly or consciously and subconsciously. (67) 
For instance, in retrospect it is clear that the writer and former Naval Intelligence officer, Ian 
Fleming, revealed the existence of the Enigma secret as early as 1953 with his reference to the 
"Lector" machine in his book From Russia with Love. (68) Part of this Freudian analysis is that the 
operations of the secret world are rather like an iceberg – 9/10ths remain hidden but we do see part 
of it. That may seem small but given that it is estimated that only a small proportion of the MI6 files 
are still in existence (see above), it is not an impossible hinderance to finding out more.  
 
Often that part of the secret world becomes visible through the press – secret agencies have to  
 
* Scott's friend, the activist writer, Noam Chomsky, still refuses to accept this revision, blinded, 
perhaps, by his strong anti-Kennedy stance. (69) 
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engage with the press in a number of ways – through defections, unusual incidents, operations that 
go wrong and the follow up enquiries. Christopher Andrew criticised one of my books in a review 
(70) for using press sources but he misinterpreted their value. The press is useful for some simple 
factual material (such as the identity of new chiefs) but the main use is for appreciating the way that 
intelligence agencies manipulate the press. This has been one of my main contributions to 
understanding the role of intelligence agencies. Through my close involvement in the case of the 
Northern Ireland information officer and "psychological" warfare operative, Colin Wallace, (see 
Paul Foot 71) I have learnt a great deal about the techniques employed; in particular, the way that 
material is deliberately "surfaced" and placed in publications. (72) 
 
As M. R. L. Smith argues in the context of writing on the Irish "Troubles" but relevant to other 
areas where there are no or few archive files, there is no reason why journalist accounts cannot be 
used - as long as they are reliable - to achieve academic ends. This requires "the assiduous 
accumulation of data. The process often relies on the piecing together of journalistic 'real-time' 
reports, matching them with other commentaries to build up a bigger, longer-term picture." (73) 
 
As part of the research for MI6, books were systematically "gutted" with the resultant material 
typed up and put back into chronological order. The sources, such as interviews, articles and books, 
were tracked down and the same process undertaken with them. This was an extremely useful 
excercise in that it soon became apparent from where material originated. This was particularly the 
case with Nicholas Bethel's account of the Albanian operation and Tom Bower's  book on the Baltic 
operations (74) where it was clear that the sources were generally limited. Once the original 
Albanian/Baltic texts were tracked, this then led to other tracts, including a source rarely used by 
British historians dealing with the intelligence services - Soviet and East European publications. 
The propaganda nature of these publications meant that they were often regarded as being too 
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unreliable for quoting. However, more recent research, such as that into the publications of East 
German propagandist Julius Mader (75), has indicated that they were often remarkably accurate. 
The reality was that the Soviets were in receipt of so much original intelligence material from 
agents in the West that they had little need to fabricate it. Thousands of MI6 documents were copied 
and handed over to their Soviet handlers by Kim Philby and George Blake. (76) When Blake was 
safely behind the Iron Curtain, the KGB and  its satellite agencies began to release documents 
which formed the basis of numerous pamphlets detailing these anti-Soviet operations. They 
revealed that almost all the MI6 sponsored emigre groups were infiltrated and that all their networks 
in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine during the early part of the Cold War had been "rolled-up" by the 
Soviet Bloc security services*. (77) 
 
The research involved employing investigative journalism techniques, which included building a 
bedrock of purely factual structural information obtained from the public domain – i.e. the identity 
of MI6 officers, their rank within the Diplomatic Corps and their specific postings at "stations" 
abroad. Some of the techniques were derived from the CIA "defector", Philip Agee, (78) who 
showed how it was possible to identify CIA officers through public records (principally the pension 
records in the State Department diplomatic record). In this country in the 1980s, Jonathan Block 
built on Agee's work through the trail of previously identified MI6 officers in official reports, such 
as expulsions from countries and newspaper accounts. (79) I took this further by an obsessive trawl 
through open sources in the public domain.  
 
No one in connection with researching MI6 before read the Foreign Office (FO) Diplomatic Lists or 
even Who's Who and Who Was Who. The Diplomatic Lists up until the mid-sixties gave detailed 
information about FO officers stationed abroad, among whom were MI6 officers stationed under  
 
*These operations are detailed in "Part Three: The Soviet Empire" (pp. 161-300). 
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'light cover' in local embassies - a cover that is, and was, easily exposed by the local security 
agencies. Some specific intelligence postings were not well hidden – for instance, in the  
1940s/1950s Passport Control Officers,  attached Foreign Office and attached British Forces HQ 
Hong Kong (a full list of identifiers is given in the author's Lobster Special) gave away  the identity 
of  intelligence officers. (80) By reading the entire entries for 1945 to 1965 and by matching their 
postings with already identified officers, I was able to identify numerous other officers. Some of 
these were self-identifying because they could be checked against officer's names in the public 
domain which had been published in previous publications such as the books of "Nigel West"; and 
those identified in Who's Who (I read all the entries from 1945-80). I found that a good source (and 
neglected one) of purely factual information were the obituaries in The Times and, more 
importantly, the Daily Telegraph. By the 1980s, a number of senior MI6 officers with wartime 
experience and service in the Cold War were beginning to die off and the obituaries were being 
written by a retired former officer who provided details of their postings and background. (81) 
 
Other neglected sources for Service names included official Soviet publications that dealt with Kim 
Philby and George Blake. The two agents identified to their Soviet handlers virtually all of the MI6 
officers (something like 400 names) who had served abroad during the period 1945 to 1963. The 
KGB controlled the release of these names in a series of propaganda exercises, including the 
publication of books and the strategic use of articles in the Soviet press. (82) Much of this material 
was confirmed by retired MI6 officers, such as Anthony Cavendish. (83) 
 
The perceived problem of officers being identified (which potentially fell within the remit of the 
Official Secrets Act) was recognised by the Foreign Office whose Security Department (the deputy 
of which was an MI5 officer) launched an investigation into my research. This was followed up 
with a letter from the Foreign Office Security Department to retired officials (84) which 
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acknowledged that there were up to twelve official publications in the public domain which could 
be used to identify MI6 officers. A decision was made not to pursue the matter further (I had a 
lawyer waiting on call in the event of any attempt to prosecute me) probably because of the 
embarrassment and the logical, and entirely reasonable, idea that it might be more effective just to 
ignore this possible breach of the Official Secrets Act. However, the authorities did subsequently 
"clean up" the Diplomatic List and removed indicators that might identify intelligence officers 
under "light" cover. Unfortunately, the process only served to highlight the fast-track promotions 
that characterise the careers of MI6 officers against the slower career climb of standard diplomats. 
 
Once the identities of officers were known, it was then a simple, but time-consuming, matter of 
building up a picture of the MI6 stations abroad and their strength in officers through the 
Diplomatic List. Research then followed into what, if any, publications these officers had written, a 
process which uncovered a number of previously unknown works, memories and diaries. An 
example were the books and pamphlets of South-East Asia specialist, Donald Lancaster. (85) The 
research was also used to identify intelligence sources quoted in previous books and journals, 
particularly on the Middle East. An example was the Arabist specialist, John Christie, an 
anonymous source of information for a book by Mustafa M. Alani, Operation Vantage: British 
Military intervention in Kuwait, 1961*. When Mr Christie personnally complained to me that he 
had never ever given an interview, I was able to point out that, although his name had been redacted 
in the main text, someone had failed to notice that his name was still in a note on page 267. In 
another book, someone had removed an officer's name from the text but not the index. (86) 
 
Despite the qualms of some historians in this area, interviews are a necessary part of research. As 
Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis suggests, human relations, particularly in and between secret  
 
*For details of the Kuwait operation in MI6 see page 671 onwards. 
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agencies, cannot always be reconstructed from documents. (87) Carfeully used, interviews are the 
most telling source for insight into how such agencies work in practice. Interviews were carried out 
by me with officials and agents involved with the intelligence services and, in a small number of 
cases, with MI6 officers. Some interviewees, such as Montague Woodhouse, were extremely 
generous with their time. Most were largely anonymous and their evidence was largely used to 
verify or not existing material. The general understanding was that they would not be quoted 
directly. I also had two long unpublished  interviews of senior MI6 officers, primarily about the 
Middle East, on a similar understanding. I was also given a long "last testament" by George 
Kennedy Young, the most and important senior officer in the Middle East and former Vice-Chief of 
the Service, which included a personal statement on the role of an intelligence officer. This was 
supplemented by material from his five published books of which no one had previously made use. 
(88) Whilst not directly about the Service, they did make reference to his intelligence activities and 

















MI6 broke new ground in terms of research and understanding in a number of key areas including 
providing new material on the organisation of the Service during different transition points in 
response to changes in the Cold War (seen through the book); the background – in terms of  
recruitment, training, organisation and philosophy - to the Service's "special operations" (again 
throughout the book); the role of academic specialists in forming the Service's "World View" (see 
Chapter Five); the increasingly importance role of technical intelligence (see Chapter 25: "The 
Techncical Fix") and its murky relationship with former fascists and Nazis as intelligence assets 
(see Chapter 8: "Germany and the 5 x 5s" in particular). However, a central theme of MI6 is that 
Secret Intelligence Service placed a strong reliance during the Cold War on personal and insider 
networks based around "old-boy"-style links to politicians and outside interests. These are identified 
by MI6 as "factions" within the Service which during particular sensitive operations were in 
"collusion" with key politicians and ministers, and foreign policy officials in a way which largely 
circumvented normal democratic control or oversight. The background to this was often the dispute 
over the nature of the "special relationship" with the United States which reflected the rather 
desperate need of official foreign policy circles for Britain to be seen to "punch above her weight". 
This led to an increasing use of the Service as a substitute for real power as intelligence-gathering, 
deception activities and special operations took the place of military intervention. "What dividends 
does Dorril's approach deliver?", asks Richard Aldrich.  
 
"First and foremost," acknowledges Aldrich, "this is an extraordinary compendium, bringing 
together almost all that is currently available on the subject." (89) In using a rich vein of sources 
previously not used in traditional academic accounts of the intelligence world, MI6 uncovered a 
27 
number of Service links to "state-private" intelligence funded or supported networks; a field of 
study that has since become a fashionable preoccupation of researchers on intelligence. (90) Based 
on neglected European Movement (EM) and National Union of Students (NUS) archive sources, 
MI6 detailed the depth of this officially/unofficial co-operation in the section on the EM by 
outlining the role played by former resistance workers who became MI6 "assets", and the way these 
connections were used to run operations among students, writers and journalists. This also led into 
discussion of the "notorious" Bilderberg group and the undercutting of numerous conspiracy 
theories that suround this organisation by revealing for the first time the central role played by an 
MI6 agent, Josef Retinger, and the use of it as a "talking-shop" to ease tension between elite British 
and American groups over Cold War disputes; an area since pursued by Professor of International 
Relations at Nottingham, John W. Young, who acknowledges the MI6 reference to Retinger. (91) 
 
By using such a diverse range of research materials, Aldrich writes that this "allows this book to 
capture some of the texture of the work of ordinary MI6 officers going about their business in the 
familar hotspots of the Cold War and during Britain's troubled retreat from empire. Matters of agent 
recruitment and tradecraft are fully explored and give this book a texture that archive-based work is 
less likely to achieve. The book is also good at identifying the personal networks." (92) MI6 details 
and uncovers the personal relationships and private "insider" networks which, it argued, are a 
central component of the way the Service works but are largely absent from traditional, narrow 
archive-based academic works. Such networks involved government ministers (former MI6 officer 
Julian Amery in particular - 93), MPs (such as ex-SOE officer Neil McLean - 94), the banking 
sector (such as former SOE senior figure Charles Hambro - 95) and the special forces (SAS founder 
David Stirling - 96). These, it is argued, were an essential and  necessary addition to the Service, 
which by the late 1950s and early 1960s was increasingly under Foreign Office supervision and 
Treasury monitoring, in order to circumvent increasing political control. But also necessary to take 
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the place of costly and potentially dangerous official operations, in order to support unofficial or 
deniable operations for which there were no official sanction. The former involved "the 
Musketeers" (Amery and McLean) in Albania (97) and the latter in the Yemen (98). 
 
This is a grey area which academics approaching the subject in a traditional manner often find 
difficult to deal with. In its approach to dealing with MI6 as a distinct intelligence agency, MI6 is 
different to most conventional accounts. Often the writing on intelligence agencies, British ones in 
particular, takes no account of bureaucratic structures – though the academic Philip Davies is a 
notable exception to this general line (99). Even so, when it does, it tends to be  functionalist and 
bears little witness to the testimony of those that actually worked inside them. In terms of 
organisation, MI6 is seen as an "ideal type" with flow charts of the organisation as a cohesive 
system constructed rationally, rather than a particular type of bureacucracy that is skewed by the 
needs of ultra secrecy. Too often not enough account is taken of the external or often hidden internal 
pressures that are exerted on it from other state bodies (the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
Military) and outside interests (oil would be one) or of the political context. This approach tends to 
create a consensual view of the intelligence world that generally only sees positives or, in a rather 
British indifferent way, such as Christopher Andrew's official history of MI5, disposes of the 
negatives in a jokey/off-hand manner. (100) In this way, much academic writing on secret agencies, 
generally ignores or underplays people's self-interest, manoeuvrings, manipulation and competition. 
Writing on these areas is too easily dismissed as "conspiracy thinking", though psychoanalysts 
would see this as the natural state of human beings in an unnatural social enviroment. 
 
Intelligence agencies are mostly treated as self-contained units which have a benign world-view 
with straight lines of communication to or from policy-makers. Peter Dale Scott's great insight 
(101), which partly came from the way he did his research, was to see (and confirmed by Newman's 
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research of the files) that factions often reside inside these bureauracies. (102) These factions often 
had extensive links to outside interests (Banks would be one). In addition, key individuals (the 
CIA's James Angleton in the US and a large presence in MI6, George Kennedy Young) exerted a 
disproportionate influence on their organisations and their operations. In contrast, most British 
researchers champion the pre-eminence of the social world over its constituent actors or human 
subjects. (103) The tendency is to either ignore these characters or to dismiss them as "mavericks", 
instead of acknowledging that, as former MI6 officer Malcolm Muggeridge wrote, secrecy corrupts 
and influences in a negative way human behaviour. (104) 
 
Scott viewed – as does MI6 - the area where the general intelligence world intersected with the 
political world as one of "covert politics", and as such, the conduct of public afffairs is often not 
undertaken "by rational debate and responsible decision-making but by indirection, collusion and 
deceit". (105) But this also works in reverse with the "political exploitation of irresponsible or para-
structures, such as intelligence agencies". A prime example would be Prime Minister, Anthony 
Eden, and "collusion" with Israel and France over Suez (and latterly New Labour Pime Minister 
Tony Blair and the Iraq war). These ideas are central to MI6 and its exploration the Suez special 
operations in 1956. This is described at length in the book in Chapter 29 ("Suez: Assassins and 
Thuggery") which details the unique relationship between the Prime Minister and the Controller 
Middle East, George Kennedy Young, the conduit for the Service's Yellow Book intelligence 
(known as Luck Break) on Nasser and the Egyptian regime.  
 
MI6 notes that special operations and much of the intelligence collection on Egypt and the Middle 
East was run by a faction (the "Robber Barons") that went in for what the senior Foreign Office 
official responsible for the intelligence side, Geoffrey McDermott, noted as "extreme right-wing 
politics". (106) Interestingly, Peter Hennessy in his latest edition of Secret State (2010) 
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acknowledges the presence of a number of extreme right-wingers in the Service (not named but 
named in MI6) during the 1950s and early 1960s but makes no comment or explores that fact. (107) 
 
MI6 argues that for most of the 1950s the Service evaded or escaped proper democratic control or 
oversight and that a small group or cabal of right-wing officers was able to forge an alliance with 
similarly-inclined ministers (and Prime Minister Eden) in order to carry out a series of special 
operations. (108) Again, traditional academics find this a difficult area, particularly when there is 
clear evidence of collusion. Generally, they dismiss ideas of  a "rogue elephant" or of an agency out 
of control. In practice, the British lack of a formal constitution allowed this to happen and without 
effective parliamentary oversight, there was no mechanism to stop it, since the Foreign Office (and 
at times the Foreign Secretary) did not have full control of the Service. Since MI6 (or more 
particularly key officers) controlled the intelligence on Suez (known as Lucky Break - 109) it is not 
clear who was controlling or manipulating who - the PM or MI6. (A question that still lacks a clear 
answer with regard to Iraq and the WMDs in 2010.)  
 
In its detailed analysis of the role played by the Service during the Suez crisis (rather than the full 
accounts of the role of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office - 110) MI6 argues that there was a 
significant gap between what was said and recorded in the official record of meetings and what 
officers recall of those same meetings and decisions. For instance, the denial of "thuggery" (i.e. 
assassinations) during the Suez operations by the military and the Foreign Office is met with 
incredulity by officers. However, their involvement in such operations is used to illustrate the point 
that a faction within the Service simply ignored the Chief's own statement that the Service did not 
engage in such activity. (111) Similar disjoints would occur in the Lebanaon and in South-East Asia 
where local controllers carried out operations without full authorisation – to the dismay of the 
Chief. The concept of "deniability" thus makes a mockery of the idea of a documentary record that 
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academics can follow through traditional means. In pursuing the trail as MI6 did, the book also 
helped explode the myths that operations against Nasser ended with the resignation of Eden. The 
new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was just "as obssessed with the idea of getting rid of 
Nasser". (112) 
 
Other operations and actions considered which had previously been immune to any serious 
investigation include those in Vietnam (113), Oman and the Yemen (114). The small section dealing 
with South East Asia is one of the most interesting in the book in that it provides a more detailed 
biography of the senior officer and future chief, Maurice Oldfield, than that portrayed in previous 
accounts of his life (115). It overturns some of the myths about this alleged "Smiley"-like figure (he 
wasn't as liberal as some believe) - and reveals the importance of the debate within the intelligence 
community on the reality or not of the Sino-Soviet split in th early sixties. (116) This section is a 
positive view of MI6 and recognises that within its ranks were some extremely intelligent 
individuals who had a realistic and insightful view of the so-called "communist menace" in S.E. 
Asia in contrast to the "domino-theory" held by the American analysts. 
 
In covering these operations, MI6 deals with an area that had not been previously mentioned in any 
post-war study of British Intelligence, namely "Deception". (117) It had appeared that the use of 
deception techniques had been confined to the War years but MI6 argued (and this was later 
confirmed by the release of files and partially by the Service's own official history) that deception 
operations in what were known as "disruptive actions" - involving deceiving particular groups, such 
as terrorists, and hostile intellgience agencies with planted disinformation in the press - were 
planned and carried out during the Cold War. Richard Aldrich did deal with the subject in The 
Hidden Hand in the following year, though we continue to differ as to its significance at the 
beginning of the Cold War (Aldrich gives it greater significance). (118) 
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In considering operations behind Iron Curtain, MI6 argued that the Service was burdened with an 
old-fashioned pre-Second World War anti-Bolshevik outlook that meant that some officers could be 
regarded as "premature" cold-warriors who went into battle against the Soviet Union before the 
embers of the War had been extinguished or had time to cool. This ensured that a potential window 
for an unofficial agreement with the Soviet Union before the Cold War began in earnest was closed 
prematurely. That Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had initially taken a much more sensible 
view of what could be done, particularly about the Middle East, and that Stalin was probably 
willing to come to some kind of accommodation with the West (119), remains controversial but has 
been recognised by some historians. However, it still invites heated disagreement in the context of 
the intelligence services and MI6, as is shown by the response to the book on the Right in the 
United States. (120) 
 
In considering the development of the operations against the Soviets, MI6 claimed that the British 
contribution was fairly limited after the election of Winston Churchill in 1951 - though it took a 
considerable amount of time to actually put an end to them. (121) As Prime Minister and in 
temporary charge of the Foreign Office when Eden was ill, Churchill had little faith in the liberation 
policy and was at loggerheads with the US administration (and the CIA) which continued to plan 
and put in place operations behind the Iron Curtain when it was clear that they had failed, and that 
the risks to the world were potentially severe. MI6 provides a more complicated version of the 
special relationship with the United States which suggests that it was for much of the 1950s largely 
presentational and that, whilst relations with individual officers was general good on the ground, 
between the services there was a degree of mutual distrust – and bitterness in the case of MI6 at the 
lack of American support - and this required continuing, and considerable, efforts to repair the 
damage (this can be seen with the establishment of the Bilderberg group, which – with its subtantial 
imput from MI6 "assets" – was designed to bridge the widening views of Atlanticist elites on the 
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Cold War). This was, MI6 argues, a pivotal moment as Eden and George Kennedy Young 
considered the option of joining the European Community to maintain a degree of independence of 
action in the Middle East free of US interference. (122)  
 
However, MI6 knew how to play the game by pandering to American anti-communist prejudices. 
This is most clearly outlined in the only, to date, detailed account of MI6's role (as against several 
ones on the CIA's contribution - 123) in the important coup against the Iranian democratically 
elected government in 1953; an event that led to the Service's eager involvement in several other 
similar exercises during that decade in the Middle East. The extensive research in the chapter is 
backed up and confirmed by a long interview with the key officer planning the coup, Norman 
Derbyshire. It is likely to remain the most complete account for some time as there appears to be no 
Service history and the Foreign Office consolidated history written for the files remains secret. 
(124) MI6 argued that the coup was a disaster in that, by bringing down the Mossadeq regime, the 
operation effectively undercut "a number of legitimate interests that were essential to the country's 
viability". (125) The coup achieved the stability that the West craved  but at a steep and destructive 
price. By putting fear of communism at the centre of its operation and thus denying the possibility 
of a democratic regime under Mossadeq's leadership, the Service's actions effectively helped 
destroy the middle ground in Iranian politics and thus laid the ground for the Shah's authoritarian 
regime that followed, and the inevitable eruption of the 1979 revolution. 
 
The "coup" is central to Iranian views of the West and MI6's contribution has been welcomed in 
Iran and by Iranian exiles as a necessary corrective to the versions peddled by the CIA. It led to 
involvement in two documentaries made by Iranian documentary film-makers and extensive 
interviews for a major American documentary on the coup, broadcast on the ABC television 
network on the 50th anniverasary in 2003. (126)  
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What MI6 also exposed was the Foreign Office delusion that once Britain had managed to rebuild 
its economy, it would be able to stand alone and undertake independent action in foreign policy and 
intelligence matters. Whilst MI6 shows that (after the Iranian coup) the special relationship was 
often a cynical exercise with the CIA and MI6 at loggerheads in key areas, Britain could never 
undertake truly independent action because it simply lacked the means to do so and was always, 
ultimately, subservient to the vastly greater resouces of its American "cousins". A number of 
misconceptions about the relationship which find their way into books on the intellgience world are 
overturned (127) particularly the apparent "four lessons" learnt from the success of the Iran coup. 
 
In "punching above our weight" - as Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd put it during the Major years - 
the British government's deployment of MI6 as a substitute for the absence of real economic or 
military power was (and remains), MI6 argues, delusional, and only served to help preserve the 
fantasy that Britain retained a deserved place on the world stage as a major power, when, in 
practice, it hid the nation's inevitable decline and thus frustrated attempts at modernisation in the 
1960s, and continues to do so to this day. This is the backdrop, the book also argues, for the failure 
of successive governments to properly enquire into the functioning and funding of MI6. As Hurd 
put it: "The past is a different country." One former officer admitted, the Service had deliberately  
and successfully cultivated "an air of mystique and importance" to its work. MI6 was part of a 
process of demystifying its activities.(128)  
 
MI6 undermined some of that mystique with its portrayal of the Service, notes Aldrich, "as 
expensive, wasteful and involved in operations which are either morally questionable or else 
involve 'low farce'." The former includes the Service's cynical campaign against the Soviet Bloc 
which deceived a number of exile groups into believing that MI6 was interested in the liberation of 
their countries behind the Iron Curtain, whereas the Service in reality used them or exploited them 
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to gather intelligence. In the process thousands lost their lives or were imprisoned in an hopeless 
campaign which, as the book argues, never had a serious chance of succeeding. The intelligence 
take from this disastrous policy was mediocre at best and almost certainly worthless. As noted 
above, the Soviet security forces and intelligence services simply rolled up the networks which had 
been penetrated from the beginning. (129) 
 
Aldrich concluded his review of MI6 with the remark that "Such trenchantly revisionist writing on 
British overseas policy is rare, and revivionist accounts that are based on a close, if skewed, reading 
of detailed scholarship and documentation are even rarer ... whether you agree with this critical 
perspective or not, the work wears it colours on its sleeve and makes for refreshing and provocative 
reading." (130) 
 
MI6 opened up a whole area of intelligence activities - operations, bureaucratic relations and 
individual stories - that had previously been deemed secret or largely impossible to investigate. It 
did so in a critical way, exposing the many myths that had grown up around a Service that even its 














MI6 was heavily reviewed and the subject of a numerous newspaper and magazine articles when it 
was published. In the subsequent decade it has retained its importance through its use on radio and 
television documentaries, and from being regularly quoted in other books and in academic journals.  
An example of how its research method bore fruit and how the Service tried to counter MI6's impact 
is shown by comparing it with the Service's own official history.  
 
In 2004, a decision was made by the then Chief of MI6, Sir John Scarlett, to produce an 
"authorised" history of the Secret Intelligence Service. Its publication by historian Professor Keith 
Jeffrey was publicised in The Times (18 September 2010) with according to its author, exclusive 
extracts of "one of the extraordinary revelations of the book". Operation Embarrass was MI6's 
covert operation to sabotage attempts by Jewish Holocaust survivors to send ship of refugees to 
their potential new home in Palestine (131). Jeffrey told The Times that when he stumbled across the 
documents in the MI6 Registry he realised that he had "unearthed an explosive story in every 
sense". Having worried that documents might be deliberately destroyed, here, he concluded, "was 
evidence that MI6 was not hiding the truth from him. This rather assured me that I could see 
everything." He added that, "If I had been systematically destroying documents to cover up all the 
bad stuff I would have bloody well destroyed those [Operation Embarrass]." (132) This is, for 
reasons outlined below, incredibly niave. 
 
According to Jeffrey, "there were hours of debate within MI6 over whether the story could be 
revealed". He argued that it had to be included to make the book credible. (133) The only problem, 
is that MI6 had covered the subject in more detail and had actually named the officers and agents 
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involved in the operation*. Jeffrey appears to have succumbed to what the historian E. H. Carr in 
What is history? referred to as the "fetish of documents". (134) Research for MI6's version had been 
culled from open sources and interviews. Comparison of the two versions reveals that MI6 was  
accurate, only being wrong or having a distinctly different interpretation in one aspect, namely the  
deception activities** running parallel to the sabotage operation. In truth, the Service was not 
revealing anything in the authorised version; Jeffrey's book merely confirmed officially the 
existence of one of its more unsavory operations in the mid to late 1940s. Further evidence that the 
"hours of debate" had more to do with fear of confirming an already existing account rather than 
any idea of unearthing "an explosive story" is the fact that MI6's account of Operation Embarrass 
was central to an international awarding-winning Canadian documentary in 2005. (135) 
 
The originality of the research and content, led MI6 to be being used in a number of other 
documentaries and books. Much to my surprise, given the paucity of information on the subject, in 
2005, Scottish BBC Radio producer, Douglas Macleod, managed to publish an entire book on the 
activities of the British and Scottish Leagues for European Freedom (BLEF/SLEF). It soon became 
apparent that this was overwhelmingly based on Chapter 21 of MI6, "The British and Scottish 
Leagues for European Freedom" (136), a unique look at previously neglected areas which had 
involved research in the Scottish National Library and its archive of SLEF material, and interviews  
with two leading figures in these particular groups who died soon after the publication of the book. 
The publisher and author later agreed to write a letter of apology acknowledging that the book, 
Morningside Mata Haris: How MI6 decieved Scotland's great and good, was based substantially on 
the MI6 chapter. (137) 
 
The breadth and depth of the material in MI6 led to the book playing a crucial role in breaking 
* See MI6 Chapter 26, "Palestine", pp. 542-549. 
** Though this did serve to confirm the author's view that deception played an important part in the 
Service's special operations. 
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through the British "conspiracy of silence" on intelligence matters and the often cosy relationships 
that exist between writers - seduced by the secrecy - and the intelligence and security services. The 
son of a senior MI6 officer, Frank Stallwood, involved in the attempted overthrow and assassination 
of President Gemal Nasser post-Suez (138), contacted me - in one of many such instances - to find 
out more about his father as he wanted to write a biography of him, having previously not known 
that he was an intelligence officer until I provided details in MI6. Stallwood had been originally  
identified by the BBC investigative journalist, Tom Mangold, but was unable to broadcast his name 
on a Panorama documentary on MI6 because of  restrictions "imposed" by the D-Notice Committee 
"guidelines". (139) As a result of the publication of MI6, the author was invited to be a consultant to 
a subsequent Panorama programme on the Secret Intelligence Service. 
 
Few writers – and fewer publishers – have been willing to ignore the desire of the authorities to 
appraise their books in a shameful example of "voluntary" pre-publication censorship. Part of the 
reason for the book's success was that, by deliberately ignoring requests from the Secretary of the 
D-Notice Committee (as it was then called) to see and "vet" – though they call it "advice" - the book 
before publication, it broke through the gentlemanly world of non-disclosure. Much to the 
embarrassment of a senior Guardian journalist, MI6 identified one of his open sources on Iran, 
Desmond Harney, as a former MI6 officer. Harney had written about Iran during the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 (140) and his material was used by the newspaper but no one until MI6 had 
identified him as a senior officer stationed in Tehran. This was part of a general unstated agreement 
in the media that it was not the done thing to identify officers; though the American media has long 
been willing to quote on the record CIA officers and does not regard this as a problem. Although 
pressure was put on the publishers and there was an extensive "legalling" process by leading 
barrister, David Hooper, for fears of breaching the Official Secrets Act, they did not buckle like 
many publishers have in the past. Nor did they when, in the week of publication, the Attorney 
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General threatened to issue a writ for breaching reporting restrictions on specific operations and 
there was a fear that the book might have to be withdrawn and possibly pulped. (141) 
 
A consequence of the publication of MI6 is that, on average, I receive every month a serious request 
for information from an author/researcher or someone seeking background on their relative. Simon 
Fraser recently (142) wrote to me in furtherance of his research into the escape in 1947 of the Polish 
prime minster, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, from Warsaw in an operation organised by MI6. His 
grandfather, Rupert Walley, captained the ship, the Baltavia, on which Mikolajczyk had been, to use 
the technical term, "exfiltrated" out of the country. He had come across the story in MI6 (143), 
which Mr Fraser found contained the most detailed account of this episode despite, he discovered, 
deep interest in the story in Poland. In August 2010 author Hannah Stoneham, currently writing a 
biography of the English novelist Barbara Comyns Carr, wanted to find out more about the 
novelist's husband, Richard Comyns Carr, who been employed in MI6's Section V with Kim Philby 
during the Second World War. She was using MI6 as the basis for her research into Richard's 
intelligence career having found little available information elsewhere. (144)  
 
MI6 has also been a major research tool for serious writers of espionage fiction. The most recent 
being Jeremy Dunn's highly acclaimed Free Agent (145) which William Boyd described as "a 
wholly engrossing and sophisticated spy novel set against a forgotten corner of 20th century 
history". The forgotten corner was partly based on Mr Dunn's reading of  MI6, which he 
acknowledged in his "Author's note" (146) as "an excellent history of the British Secret Intelligence 
Service, which led me to many other works".  
 
The ripples out from MI6 have been and remain very strong on both to a wide public and on an 
academic level, where, whether they agree or not with the conclusions, researchers and writers have 
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had to consider its coverage of a range of topics and operations from Iran (147), the Yemen (148) to 
Vietnam (149). The ramifications have been extensive, including being a consultant to, or being 
heavily involved with through extensive interviews, and, in many cases, the sole or major source on 
the intelligence side, in a number of television, radio and film documentaries not only nationally but 
also internationally in Hungary, France, Canada and the United States. (150) I have also had in-
depth interviews concerning MI6's activities with newspapers and magazines from around the 
world, including Japan, Germany, the United States, France, Portugal and South Africa. The 
intensive research displayed on such areas as the 1953 Iran coup, has meant that MI6 has continuing 
importance as a form of knowledge transfer to the public, which is undertaken through dozens of 
public and conference talks, and led to his deployment by the BBC as an "expert" on the Service 
and intelligence operations. (151) Mark Curtis, former Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, in his wide-ranging look at British Foreign policy, Web of Deceit (2003) - 
which includes twenty-five references to MI6 as a source on the Middle East - called Dorril, 















In the context of academic scholarship on intelligence, even with its highly critical stance on its 
subject, MI6 has gained acceptance within a research area that is often conservative in its stance and 
sometimes cosily aligned with or sympathetic to the intelligence and security agencies. Such a 
revivionist account will always be controversial, but the fact that it has such strong support from  
one of the subject area's leading academics, Richard Aldrich, is evidence that this is a major work 
that has helped point the way forward to further research in a highly contested area, and has opened 
up possible ways of undertaking research for academics who are only now tentatively dealing with 
some of the controversial intelligence areas of the Cold War.  
 
There has been in the decade since MI6 was published an  increasing academic interest in 
intelligence studies with a new generation of researchers investigating the area which has led to a 
welcome flood of new books, papers and studies on the subject. However, as evidenced by the 
bibliography of journals such as Intelligence and National Security (153) the areas and operations 
covered by MI6 and the Secret Intelligence Service itself have only generated a relatively small 
number of studies and fewer books. Whilst there have been plenty of  UK studies based on recently 
released archive material covering security and, to a lesser exent, intelligence operations up to the 
end of the Second World War, the archives, and in particular British ones, remain largely closed for 
those studying post-war intelligence and special operations. What little direct intelligence material 
has been disclosed has mostly been part of a controlled exercise. Such is the fate of Keith Jeffrey 
and his authorised history of MI6 whose notes for the final chapters covering some of the same 
subjects as MI6 in the period of 1945 to 1949 manage to contain not a single reference to any 
internal MI6 files. (154) It is partly for this reason that former MI6 officer, Harry Ferguson, stated 




By using innovative research techniques to uncover the story of an organisation that had been 
deemed impervious to serious investigation due to the absence of traditional archives, MI6 forged a 
new trail in researching secret agencies. In doing so it presented a challenge to previous scholarship 
and ideas of what could and could not be researched. With its highly critical interpretation of the 
Service's role – based on substantial gathered evidence - and its tying in of the Service to strands 
within British foreign policy, it opened up the debate on the role and significance of intelligence 
agencies within British society during the Cold War and after. It did so in a particular manner and 
style so that what might previously have been an obscure debate among a few practitioners, writers, 
commentators and academics was brought to a much wider public than is generally the case for an 
academic study. 
                                        
MI6 overturned the official and sanitised view of intelligence activities and the role of the Secret 
Intelligence Service during the Cold War that, up until that point, had largely been unchallenged by 
academics. That the Service's own "authorised" history is so slim on the early part of the Cold War 
and ends at 1949 illustrates the extreme nervousness about documentating the period covered by 
MI6 and confirms the book's achievement – and continuing relevance - in researching and 
investigating a controversial and highly secretive area that had previously been deemed impossible. 
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